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Abstract 
Over the reform period, industry has been the source of forty percent of GDP, 
and has contributed 90% of China’s exports.  Annual firm level surveys that 
begin in 1992, along with industry-wide census in 1995, 2004 and 2008 are 
rich sources of data on firms’ actions in this important sector.  It is well-known 
that working with Chinese data requires overcoming challenging measurement 
issues. Macroeconomic series are often suspected to suffer from political 
interference or reporting biases that stem from political incentives.  Working 
with the firm-level data has its own challenges.  Making sure that comparisons 
over time are consistent is perhaps the most difficult and pervasive issue.  This 
is because of sampling as well as measurement issues for key variables, such as 
ownership type, real output, value-added, wages, and the capital stock.  These 
problems are apparent, for example, in discrepancies between the evolution of 
aggregates from the firm-level data and aggregate statistics in the national 
income accounts.  In this paper, we provide an introduction to these data sets.  
We discuss and illustrate several of the issues that make comparability over 
time difficult and we suggest solutions for many of them. The importance of a 
particular measurement issue often depends on the exact application.  We 
illustrate this point by tracing the evolution of the relative productivity level of 
entrants and incumbents over time, trying to distinguish between changes in 
actual performance and changes driven by measurement problems.  We 
conclude by identifying a few promising areas of future research and margins 
on which collaboration among users to improve these data might be beneficial.   
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The Chinese economy over the last decade is an amazing place to do economic research, 
especially studying the manufacturing sector.  The pace of growth has been startling which 
accelerates the impact of any changes or trends.  Partly this was due to the reforms and ensuing 
restructuring.  Partly this was the result of China integrating rapidly into the world economy and 
becoming the world’s factory. 
Equally amazing is that coinciding with this boom of economic activity, the information from 
the Chinese firm-level industrial survey has become available to researchers.  The official name 
of this dataset is “all state owned and all above-scale non-state owned industrial enterprise 
database”.  It contains information similarly as collected by other countries, but it has become 
more widely available without cumbersome access requirements.  This source of information 
provides us with a unique window on the economic changes that have reshaped the Chinese 
manufacturing sector. 
Dougherty et al. (2007) and Jefferson et al. (2008) were two of the earliest studies using these 
data.  They analyzed topics of particular importance to China, namely, the emergence of the 
private sector and productivity convergence by ownership type and across space.  Since then 
researchers have studied a variety of topics spanning almost all fields of economics.  In 
macroeconomics, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Song et al. (2011) have used the data to study 
resource reallocation and aggregate TFP growth.  In international economics, Park et al. (2010) 
study the impact of the Asian financial crises on Chinese manufacturing firms and Brandt et al. 
(2012) document large productivity effects associated with China’s entry into the WTO.  In 
industrial organization, Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2013) estimate the efficiency gains resulting 
from restructuring of the electricity sector. Aghion et al. (2012) evaluate the effectiveness of 
China’s industrial policy more generally.  Summarizing all the contributions would be far 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Chinese official statistics are often viewed with suspicion.  It is often claimed, for example, 
that local officials have an incentive to overstate GDP growth in their jurisdiction to further their 
own careers.  As a result, the sum of provincial GDP exceeds independent estimates of national 
GDP by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) by a large margin.  While we do not 
believe the firm-level data undergo similar manipulations, there are important data issues a 
researcher needs to address to obtain reliable information. 
We set ourselves three tasks in this survey paper.  First, we will describe the dataset in some 
detail and compare it to similar firm surveys from other countries.  We discuss sampling and 
coverage, which has grown from 300,000 industrial firms in 1992, the first available survey year, 
to more than 10 million firms in the 2008 census.  Finally, we describe the variables available. 
Second, the availability of information on such a large panel of firms in such a rapidly 
evolving economic environment has enormous research appeal, but exploiting the panel and time 
dimensions of the dataset also entails big challenges.  The following four issues have been 
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particularly difficult in the Chinese case: (i) linking observations over time to identify firms, (ii) 
obtaining detailed price deflators, (iii) constructing the real capital stock, (iv) making sure that 
variables are defined consistently over time.  On each of these dimensions, we will discuss what 
the nature of the problem is, how we have dealt with it in our own work, and in some cases what 
alternative solutions could be applied. 
Third, we will illustrate the importance of dealing appropriately with measurement issues by 
illustrating the impact on one economic phenomenon.  In particular, we calculate the gap in total 
factor productivity between new entrants and incumbent firms and trace the evolution of this gap 
over time.  We show that the way some of the data challenges discussed above are handled can 
substantially change the economic findings. 
We conclude the paper by highlighting a few areas of research on the Chinese economy that 
are still underdeveloped and where the NBS firm-level data could answer important questions. 
2. The NBS survey of above-scale industrial firms 
2.1 Coverage of the sample 
The Chinese firm-level data is similar to the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) maintained 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census or to the widely used census data for Colombia and Chile.  
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009) document comparable data sources for 24 
countries and use the information to compare patterns of firm dynamics internationally.  Two of 
the most important differences between the Chinese data and that of many other countries pertain 
to sampling.  
First, the unit of observation is a firm, defined as a legal unit (faren danwei).  Large Chinese 
enterprises may have multiple subsidiaries.  As long as these subsidiaries are legal units, they 
will enter the dataset as individual firms.  Subsidiaries that are not legal units, so-called 
“industrial activity units (chanye huodong danwei), are excluded. According to China Statistical 
Yearbook, a legal unit needs to meet the following requirements: “(1) They are established 
legally, having their own names, organizations, location and able to take civil liability; (2) They 
possess and use their assets independently, assume liabilities and are entitled to sign contracts 
with other units; (3) They are financially independent and compile their own balance sheets.”2 
In contrast, most other countries sample plants or establishments, i.e. physical entities 
operating at a particular address. The data sets of Bureau Van Dijk, which are compiled from 
company account filings and are available for most countries, are also at the firm level.
3
  For 
many entities, the plant/firm definition coincides: for example, 93.5% of plants in the U.S. 
                                                 
2
 Source: Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators, Chapter 13, China Statistical Yearbook 2009.  
3
 Its commercial database products are known as AMADEUS, which contains firm-level information for 
European countries and is most widely used by academic researchers, or ORBIS which covers data for all sizeable 
countries worldwide. Firm coverage varies by country.   
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Census belong to single-plant firms.  In most years, Chinese firms are asked how many of their 
establishments are engaged in industrial activities.  In 1998, 7.6% of firms report zero, 88.9% 
report a single production plant, 1.4% have two plants, and 2.0% more than two. In 2007, the 
share of single-plant firms increased to 96.6%.  In the 2008 economic census, the NBS collected 
separate information for firms and their establishments.  
A second unusual feature of the Chinese data set is the minimum threshold for inclusion in the 
sample.  In the data sets for the Latin American countries mentioned, the sample consists of all 
active plants with at least 10 workers which are sampled every year. In the United States, all 
manufacturing establishments that have registered with the IRS to pay Social Security tax for 
their employees are sampled in census years (every five years).  In the intervening years, the 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers includes all plants with at least 250 employees, all plants with 
annual shipments of at least 500 million USD (since 1984), and all other plants appearing in the 
preceding census as well as new entrants are sampled with a probability proportional to their size 
(and they remain in the sample until the next census year). 
In China, we observe annual firm-level data for “above-scale” industrial firms, also called 
firms above designated size.  This includes all state owned firms as well as non-state firms with 
sales exceeding 5 million RMB.
4
  In 2011, the designated size increased from 5 million to 20 
million RMB.  In addition, in census years all industrial firms, irrespective of size, are sampled.
5
  
Panel (a) in Table 1 indicates the number of observations in each year.  The above-scale sample 
grows from 165,118 observations in 1998 to 327,853 in 2008. 
Three things are important to point out.  First, it is impossible to know a firm’s annual sales 
until some information has been collected on the firm.  This is especially notable in 2004, a 
census year.  The number of firms included in the above-scale sample jumped by 82,870 
observations (net entry), or 42.2% of the number of firms active in the preceding year.  This was 
several times higher than the usual rate of net entry, which averaged 4.9% over the four 
preceding years.  Due to the rapid expansion of the economy, many firms had experienced strong 
sales growth and had already surpassed the sales threshold for some years without the NBS 
including them in the sample.  For any analysis on entry behavior, it is important to take into 
account a firm’s starting year, a variable in the survey, when identifying new entrants.6 
Second, small firms can be included in the sample if they generate a very high level of 
revenue given their employment.  This can be due to extremely high productivity or due to 
measurement error.  Importantly, sample selection in the Chinese data set at the lower threshold 
                                                 
4
 At the exchange rate of 8.27 RMB per USD (in force between January 1997 and July 2005), this amount to 
605,000 USD. 
5
 Self-employed individuals are in principle excluded.  Private firms with up to 8 employees could register this 
way and operate under a different legal system. 
6
 70.9% of new entrants in the 2004 above-scale sample reported a starting year before 2003, i.e. were at least 2 
years old.  The corresponding statistic in the previous year was 64.7% and in the following year only 51.4%. 
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is biased towards highly productive small firms.  In contrast, most countries use a minimum 
employment threshold (e.g. at least 10 workers), which induces an opposite bias towards 
unproductive small firms. 
Third, the inclusion threshold for non-state firms of having sales above 5 million RMB is not 
a hard rule.  Firm that are in the sample one year, but whose sales dropped below the threshold 
the next year, are no longer required to report to the annual survey.  However, many of these 
firms decided to continue their reporting and they are not automatically removed from the 
sample.  In total, 5% of private or collectively-owned firms have sales below 5 million RMB 
(while there should be none) compared to 19% of state firms (where all small firms should be 
counted).  These percentages are only slightly higher if we calculate them only for new entrants 
in the sample or only for firms that will exit the sample in the next year.  It suggests that the sales 
threshold was not of prime importance.  Moreover, the extremely high rate of growth in the 
Chinese manufacturing sector over this period makes sales reductions relatively rare anyway.  
We believe that churning in the sample because of the minimum size threshold is virtually 
nonexistent.   
The NBS firm-level data available to us starts as early as 1992, a year when all firms with 
independent accounting were covered, about 350,000 firms.  In 1998, the NBS changed the 
coverage of the annual survey to include all state owned firms and only the above-scale non-state 
firms.  It also changed the firm identifiers as part of a wider overhaul of the statistical apparatus.  
As a result, firms can only be linked over time from 1998 onwards and most studies start their 
sample in that year. The survey has been conducted in all subsequent years, but to the best of our 
knowledge the latest year with reliable data available is 2008.
7
  Therefore, we focus on the 1998-
2008 sample period.  The full sample covers all industrial firms, which is defined here to include 
mining, manufacturing, and public utilities. This corresponds to Chinese Industrial Classification 
(CIC) codes 0610-1210, 1311-4392, and 4411-4620.  Many studies limit themselves to the 
manufacturing sector.  
[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
In Table 1 we report the sum of several important variables in the firm-level data in panel (a) 
and the corresponding totals from the China Statistical Yearbook or the China Statistical 
Abstract in panel (b).  In principle, the coverage should be identical and the discrepancies are 
indeed relatively small.  For the majority of variables reported, the differences between the first 
two panels are less than 0.1%.  For 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2007 all aggregates are identical, 
confirming that the firm-level data we use are also the basis for the numbers reported in the 
Chinese Statistical Yearbooks.  For 1998 and 2000, only the employment aggregates are 
inexplicably lower in the sample, by 8.9% and 3.4%, while in 2006 only exporting is slightly 
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 The data file for 2009 misses important variables, such as revenue, wages, material input, and fixed assets. The 
data files for 2010 and 2011 that we obtained had incorrect information for employment. 
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higher (+1.5%).  In 2001, the number of firms reported in the Yearbook suggests that we miss 
1.3% of active firms and it is thus not surprising that the totals for all variables are slightly lower 
as well.  Finally, in 2004 and 2005 there are small discrepancies, but without a pattern: some 
variables match, others do not; sometimes the sample aggregate is higher, other times it is higher 
in the Yearbook.  
Overall, differences are minor, except for 2008, for which we miss a substantial fraction of 
the above-scale firms, approximately 30 percent.  Some three-digit industries are missing entirely, 
but that does not explain the entire difference.  The absence of these firms will lead to higher 
than usual apparent rates of exit in 2007.  In principle, we can recover these firms from the 2008 
census.  Even though there is no explicit variable to identify above-scale firms exactly,
8
 using the 
state registration type and the 5 million RMB sales threshold, the number of firms closely 
matches the number reported in the Yearbook.  However, we have not completed the sample as 
the number of reported variables in the census is much more limited.  The recovered 
observations would be useless for all the most basic analysis. 
As mentioned, the NBS occasionally conducts a full industrial firm census which covers all 
active firms, irrespective of size or ownership.  In 1995, 493,204 firms were surveyed, in 2004, 
more than 1.37 million firms and in 2008, 1.90 million firms.  The statistics in panel (c) of Table 
1 allow two additional comparisons.  First, we extract from the different censuses all firms that 
are either SOEs or non-SOEs with sales larger than 5 million RMB, and compare them with our 
firm-level data set.  The aggregates again correspond extremely well.  
Second, we indicate the coverage of the above-scale sample relative to the full population of 
firms.  In 1995, slightly less than one third of active firms was above-scale, but the large influx 
of relatively small non-state entrants reduced the coverage of the above-scale sample to only one 
fifth of the total by 2004.  However, the excluded firms only account for a small fraction of 
economic activity.  In 2004 they employed 28.8% of the industrial workforce, but only produced 
9.3% of output and generated barely 2.5% of exports.
9
  
2.2 Available variables 
Compared to many other countries, the set of available variables in the Chinese data set is 
unusually extensive.  Table 2 lists the most important variables. In the first panel are variables 
that are included throughout the entire sample period.
10
  They include identifying information 
with detailed industry and geographic codes.  Firm ownership can be identified using the official 
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 From our analysis of the 2004 data we know that inclusion in the firm-level annual sample does not follow the 
5 million RMB threshold exactly. 
9
 The original statistics reported in the 2005 Chinese Statistical Yearbook show smaller totals, for example 
output was only 18.72 trillion RMB. The higher figure reported in the 2006 Chinese Statistical Yearbook reflects the 
upward revision following the 2004 Census. 
10
 A few exceptions with missing information in a single year are denoted by superscripts. 
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registration type or from the share in paid-up capital of different groups.  Stock variables include 
various measures of assets, debt, inventory, and accounts receivable.  Flow variables detail 
various dimensions of output, including export volumes, inputs, and taxes. 
[Insert Table 2 approximately here] 
In more recent years, several aspects of firms operations are broken down in much greater 
detail.  Aspects of firm performance, on both the revenue and the cost side, are reported 
separately for the main line of business and limited to operational activities.  Costs categories 
that were not available previously, and thus underestimated total costs, are now included.  This 
includes various employment benefits beyond salaries, e.g. pension benefits.  It also includes 
detailed cost categories such as advertising, transportation, and employee training, among others.  
Some other useful pieces of information, such as accounts payable, number of female employees, 
and cash flow variables are now reported as well. 
Finally, in the bottom panel of Table 2 we list a number of variables that are interesting for 
specific research topics, but which are not systematically reported.  These include output 
measured at constant prices, i.e. using a set of reference prices provided by the NBS, which we 
have used to construct detailed price deflators in some years.  R&D expenditures are reported for 
six years and the number of computers in one.  In the census year 2004, above-scale firms 
reported their employment broken down by education level and for various non-exhaustive 
worker categories, separately for total and for female employment. 
3. Four measurement challenges 
As mentioned, effectively exploiting the panel and time dimensions of the dataset raises several 
measurement challenges.  For example, nearly 90% of firms report no R&D expenditures in any 
of the years between 2001 and 2007 (this variable is missing in 2004).  The high percentage of 
zeroes could reflect reality or be due to reporting errors.  Another example is the curious fact that 
seven percent of firms report “foreign or Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT)” as ownership 
type, even though their paid-up capital owned by foreign or HMT investors is zero.  Below we 
focus on four major issues and for each we address three key questions:  What is the problem?  
How did we solve it in our own research?  How good are the solutions and are there alternatives?  
To foster collaboration in tackling these issues, we made available online files with 
concordance tables, supplementary information, and programs that were used in Brandt et al. 
(2012, 2013).  We have now updated these files through 2008 and improved some of the 
programs, often in response to comments and feedback we received.
11
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 Data and program files with supplementary information are available online at 
http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/China/.   
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3.1 Matching of firms over time  
The majority of firm linkages over time are made directly using the unique firm identifiers 
assigned by the NBS.  The current system of IDs was implemented in 1998 and the same IDs are 
also used in the full census.  Occasionally, however, a firm receives a new ID if it goes through a 
change in its legal registration, for example following a restructuring, merger or acquisition. 
Where possible, we have tracked firms when their boundaries or ownership structure changed, 
using information on their name, phone number, address, etc.  This is especially important in the 
Chinese context as many incumbents were restructured or privatized.  To investigate the effects 
of such restructurings we need to be able to link the old and new manifestations of the firm.
12
   
The algorithm we used to establish firm linkages over time is available online.  It consists of 
the following steps.  First, we match firms in two consecutive years using the NBS ID.
13
  Each 
year 10 to 30 observations have duplicate IDs, in which case we additionally use the firm name 
to find a match.  When for a particular firm no observation with the same ID can be found in the 
next year, we rely on (combinations of) the firm name (in Chinese), the name of legal person 
representative (in Chinese), phone number, address, name of main product, geographic code, 
industry code, and the founding year to look for an alternative match.
14
  Second, firms might 
disappear from the sample and re-enter later.  Therefore, we subsequently try to match remaining 
observations in data files two years apart, again using both the IDs and other identifying 
information.  We continue with this procedure across all years to establish an eleven-year long, 
unbalanced panel. 
Table 3 shows how often we have been able to link observations in different years and the 
resulting firm histories.  7.2% of all entities are only observed in a single year.  This amounts to 
184,000 single-year firms, approximately 28% of the total number of firms we identify.  At the 
other extreme, 11% of observations belong to firms that we observe in each of the eleven years.  
The table also shows that the number of firms active for 2 to 3, 4 to 5, or 6 to 10 years becomes 
successively smaller, but each group accounts for successively more observations.  
Approximately one half of observations belong to firms that are observed at least five years, 
which implies that they must have entered before the 2004 census year. 
[Table 3 approximately here] 
                                                 
12
 At the same time, to make sure that such re-entry of a restructured firm with a new ID is not confused with de 
novo entry of a new firm, we always verify the reported startup year for entrants. 
13
 In 1-2% of cases, there is a difference in case (upper or lower) for IDs that are otherwise unique and observed 
in two or more years. We uniformly changed all letters in the IDs to upper case. 
14
 The geographic codes are updated yearly to reflect changes of administrative boundaries.  These include the 
incorporation of adjacent rural areas as new districts into existing cities, spinning-off urban districts as independent 
cities, or promoting fast-growing cities, for example from county to prefecture level.  The relevant codebooks are 
available on the NBS website.  Baum-Snow et al. (2013) is one example of a research project where time-consistent 
city definitions are created, undoing the occasional administrative reclassification of well-defined geographic areas.  
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In the last two columns of Table 3 we show how often a link is established using information 
other than the NBS ID.  On average, only 3.3% of the links use the additional information.  This 
is misleading however, and at the firm-level more than 11% of the firms have at least one annual 
link established using information other than the firm ID.  The probability of linking a firm using 
other information increases (slightly) in the number of years a firm is active—as establishing 
such links to bridge restructuring episodes is an important way to identify long-surviving firms.  
Because firms linked using this supplementary information can be followed over a longer 
period—almost 30% of firms active all eleven years experienced and ID change at least once—
the total number observations that belong to a firm that experienced an ID switch stands at 15%. 
The online appendix to Brandt et al. (2012) reports a few additional patterns about the 
linkages.  As the sample period progresses, the number of links that can be established increases, 
i.e. the observed entry and exit rates go down.  Moreover, the importance of other information 
than IDs to establish links becomes less important over time as the rate of firm restructuring 
slowed down.  Not surprisingly, the probability a firm changes registration type (ownership) 
from one year to the next is more than twice as high when the match is made using other 
information than the ID. 
We end up with an unbalanced panel of firms that increases in size from 163,295 firms in 
1998 to 326,610 in 2007.  Table 4 contains the total number of active firms in each year and 
breaks this down for each year between incumbents, entrants, and exiting firms.  From 2001 to 
2002, for example, the total number of firms increased from 167,259 to 179,811, or a net 
increase of 12,552. Gross entry was significantly higher, namely 30,733, but this was offset by 
the exit of 19,676 firms, or gross entry and exit flows of 17.1% and 11.8% of active firms.  
[Table 4 approximately here] 
The sharp increase in the number of firms between 2003 and 2004 that was mentioned already 
stands out.  This increase in entry can be attributed to the 2004 Industrial Census, and the 
identification of many firms, mostly privately-owned, that should already have been covered in 
the sample in earlier years.  The large number of entrants in 2008, in spite of our incomplete 
firm-level data file, can similarly be attributed to the 2008 Industrial Census.
15
  As we observe 
the founding year for each firm, we can correctly identify a firm’s actual entry year in the 
industry, as opposed to entry in the sample, such that sampling issues do not confound the true 
entry and exit patterns.  
Important to note in this respect is that the average age of newly entered firms (in the sample) 
is declining over time.  The median age for firms first showing up in the sample in 1999 or 2000 
was four years.  This declined to an average age of three years for new entrants in 2001 and 2002 
and further to two years in 2003.  The additional firms picked up in the 2004 census year 
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 The higher than usual fraction of exiting firms in 2007 is almost certainly due to the incomplete data file and it 
does not reflect an economic reality. 
10 
 
temporarily increased the median age of newly entered firms again, but the downward trend 
continues afterwards, with a median of two years in all subsequent years.  
3.2 Price deflators  
To make nominal variables comparable over time, we need a price deflator to express them in 
constant year prices.  To construct an output deflator at the most detailed level possible, we use 
information from the 1998-2003 firm surveys.  For those years, firms were asked to report the 
value of their output not only in nominal terms, but also in real prices using a set of “reference 
prices” provided by the NBS.  The ratio of nominal to real output provides a firm-specific index 
of its price level in that year relative to the base year.  The change in this index between two 
years measures the firm-specific price change, which we average to the four-digit industry level.  
We only use the information in the price changes, not the levels, as a change in the composition 
of active firms has noticeable effects on the average price level.  We drop as outliers 
observations for which the price change differs by more than half of the standard deviation from 
the mean, or approximately 15-25% of observations.  We then recalculate the weighted average 
price change for each sector, using current output weights.
16
  Annual price changes are linked 
over time to construct an output deflator for each of the 458 four-digit industries.  For the 
remainder of the sample period, 2004-2008, we use the two-digit (39 industries) ex-factory price 
index from the China Statistical Yearbook to extend the more detailed deflator. 
To construct real value added—defined as output net of goods purchased for resale, indirect 
taxes, and material inputs—we need an input deflator for raw materials and intermediate inputs.  
This we construct using our output deflators and input shares calculated from the 2002 National 
Input-Output (IO) table.  Most of the sectors defined in the IO table are less detailed than the 
industry definition used in the firm-level data and we have constructed a concordance table 
linking the IO sectors to the four-digit industries.  We first calculate an aggregate output price 
index for each IO sector as an un-weighted average of underlying industry prices.  We then 
obtain the input deflator for each IO sector by calculating a input-share weighted average of 
these output deflators. 
The third deflator we need is for investment which we used in the construction of the real 
capital stock (below).  Perkins and Rawski (2008) have constructed a chain-linked price deflator 
based on separate price indices for equipment-machinery and buildings-structures. The weights 
are the share of these items in fixed investment, as reported by China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics. 
[Figure 1 approximately here] 
                                                 
16
 This procedure to drop outliers generates deflators that are similar to those obtained using the median price 
change by sector. 
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Figure 1 shows the evolution over time of all three deflators.  Output prices (solid lines) 
decreased in most industries between 1998 and 2002 following the Asian financial crisis and 
only began to rise almost universally after 2003.  Over the full eleven-year period, the median 
sector experienced an increase in its output price of only 17.9% or 1.7% per year.  The thinner 




 percentiles across industries, which illustrates that there is a large 
dispersion in the price evolution.  Only one half of all industries experienced price inflation 
within an 8.7% to 45.3% band (cumulatively) over the sample period 
Over the same period, input prices rose on average by 36.5%, with one half of the increase 
occurring over the last 2 years.  This is twice as fast as output prices increases, but the difference 
across industries is more modest here—partially because of the higher aggregation at which we 
calculate input price growth.  The input deflators are weighted averages of output deflators, with 
a much higher weight on industries producing raw materials and energy products than these 
industries represent in the overall economy.  These products saw especially rapid price increases 
after 2003. 
One potential source of measurement error is the input prices faced by export processors.  
These firms are allowed to import raw materials and intermediates duty-free.  In the years 
preceding and following China’s entry into the WTO, in 2001, import tariffs came down, also on 
intermediate goods and we expect this to be reflected in prices.  In principle, intermediate goods 
prices for export processers should not have been affected, but we have no way to construct 
alternative indices for them.  Input price inflation is likely to be biased upward for these firms, 
leading to an underestimate of real input use and an overestimate of value-added and 
productivity. 
3.3 Firm-level real capital stock 
A weakness of the Chinese data is the unusual way the capital stock is measured.  In each year 
fixed assets are reported three ways: (i) “original fixed assets” is the sum of past investments at 
historical prices, (ii) “net” is original fixed assets less accumulated depreciation, (iii) “total” is 
net fixed assets with construction materials and ongoing construction added.   
These book values sum nominal values for different years and should not be used directly.  
We make a number of assumptions to convert this information into a real value of the capital 
stock that is more comparable across time and across firms.  Failure to do so is likely to 
introduce a systematic bias into the capital stock measure with respect to a firm’s age. 
Our procedure begins with estimating the real value of the capital stock in the first year that a 
firm appears in our data set.  For simplicity of exposition, we assume this is 1998, the first year 
of our panel.  In the absence of information on a firm's past investments and depreciation, we use 
information from the 1993 annual enterprise survey to construct estimates of the average rate of 





  Combined with information on the age of each firm, these estimates are used to 
calculate the nominal capital stock in the firm’s startup year.  The real capital stock for that year 
is obtained by deflating with the investment deflator. 
The nominal capital stock up through 1998 is then calculated by multiplying the firm’s initial 
capital stock with the average sector-province growth rate for the number of years since the firm 
was established.  Annual investment is the change in nominal capital stock between years plus 
depreciation, assumed to run at 9% annually.  The real capital stock for 1998 is calculated using 
the perpetual inventory method, using the same depreciation rate and deflating annual investment.  
We continue this procedure for years after 1998, only using the observed change in the firm's 
nominal capital stock at original purchase prices as our estimate of nominal fixed investment. 
In Table 5 we explore whether the capital stock thus obtained shows markedly different 
patterns from the net fixed asset value that is reported directly in the data set.  In adjacent rows 
we compare for two groups of firms the capital-labor ratios constructed using either capital stock 
variable.  The absolute values generated by our procedure tends to be higher, compare an 
average of 36.8 thousand RMB in real capital per worker in 1998 with 27.6 thousand RMB in net 
fixed assets in the same year. The average growth rate between 1998 and 2008 is very similar 
using both measures: 44% or 43% over ten years or 3.7% annually. 
[Table 5 approximately here] 
For other comparisons, however, the differences are larger.  State owned firms appear to 
employ 19% (=1/0.81) more capital per worker using the book value, but 24% more using the 
real capital measure.  Somewhat counterintuitively, small firms with fewer than 100 employees 
work with 9% more reported capital, but this gap disappears almost entirely using the calculated 
capital stock.  Finally, and most strikingly, it is no surprise that incumbents have more capital per 
employee than new entrants, but while the difference is only 21% in the reported series, it is 
almost one half higher using the calculated real capital stock per worker. 
In the right columns of Table 5, we make similar comparisons, but using the ratio of capital 
over value added.  While the capital-labor ratio reflects only input substitution, the capital-value 
added ratio is also influenced by productivity differences.  Lower numbers indicate a more 
efficient use of the capital stock, i.e. capital productivity.  The most interesting discrepancy is in 
the comparison in the bottom two rows.  While incumbents show a higher capital productivity 
using book values, entrants appear 10% more productive using the calculated capital stock.  In 
two of the three other comparisons the capital productivity gap is merely accentuated when we 
use the new capital measure, while the change over time is more or less invariant, again, to the 
measure used. 
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3.4 Variables that changed definition or content over time 
(a) Industry classification  
Each firm is classified into an industry following the four-digit Chinese Industry Classification 
(CIC) system that resembles the older U.S. SIC system.  The first Chinese industry classification 
was published in 1984 and it was revised in 1994, 2002 and 2011.  Compared to previous 
versions, the 2003 CIC system (based on the 2002 revision) incorporates more detail for some 
industries, while other industries were merged.  In several cases, the numeric code even changed 
without any change in coverage.  To make the industry codes consistent across the entire period, 
we constructed a harmonized classification that groups some industries prior to or following the 
revision.  The new classification covers fewer industries, a total of 458, and is made available 
online 
In spite of this change, we still find that a large fraction of firms switch industries over time.  
As in the United States, a firm is classified into the sector of its main product by sales revenue.  
In the dynamic Chinese economy and with rapidly expanding export sales, it is natural to see 
more sectoral changes than in other countries.  Statistics in Table 6 demonstrate that 18% of all 
firms change their four-digit sector affiliation at least once and this fraction is strongly increasing 
in the number of years we observe a firm in the sample.  For firms observed at least six years, the 
likelihood they experience a sectoral switch surpasses 40%.  Naturally, switches are more 
substantial and less common between industries that are defined at a higher level of aggregation.  
Even at the two-digit level, one tenth of all firms are observed to switch industries and more than 
one fifth of firms that are observed at least six years.  
[Table 6 approximately here] 
(b) Ownership 
An important variable used in many studies is the firm's registered type (qiye dengji zhuce 
leixing).  It distinguishes 23 exhaustive ownership types, which includes joint ventures between 
different types of owners.  In Brandt et al. (2012) we classified each firm into one of five basic 
groups: state owned, hybrid or collective, private, and two types of foreign firms, those from 
Hong-Kong, Macau, and Taiwan and those from all other countries.
18
  Foreign categories include 
both joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries.   
A major evolution in the Chinese economy is the growing importance of private firms.  This 
is due both to new firms being predominantly private as well as firms changing ownership.  One 
quarter of all firms move between one of the detailed categories and 17% even change between 
one of the five broadly defined groups.  By far the most common switch is from the 
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 Hong Kong-based subsidiaries of foreign multinationals are included in the first foreign category as there is no 
straightforward way to distinguish them from other Hong Kong firms. 
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hybrid/collective category—which accounted for 38% of all firms in 1998, but for less than 6% 
of the total in 2008—to private. 
An alternative approach to classify firms into different types is to use information on the 
registered capital.  The share of each firm’s “paid-up” capital is reported separately for six types 
of owners: state, collective, individual, legal person, Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan, and foreign.  
One problem is that the “legal person” category can capture a wide range of possibilities—from 
investment stakes of state-controlled shareholding companies to private subsidiaries.  In 1998 
this category accounted for 18% of all paid-up capital, but it increased to 33% in 2008, the 
strongest increase of any of the six types.  Gao and Van Biesebroeck (2013) show that the two 
alternative ways of identifying firms that were initially state owned—and thus directly exposed 
to the subsequent restructuring—has a pronounced impact on the estimated effect of reform in 
the electricity sector. 
(c) Employment and wages  
Two more variables that sometimes raise questions are employment and wage costs.  When the 
economic reforms spread to the manufacturing SOEs in the urban sector in the mid-1990s, many 
workers were laid off and sent home, or xiagang.  Initially, these workers remained on the 
payroll of their former employers, albeit at reduced wages and benefits, and were still included in 
NBS estimates of firm employment.  By the late 1990s, the status of many of these individuals 
had been reclassified, which helps explain the sharp drop in employment in national figures in 
SOEs during this period.  Some of the decline in total industrial employment we observe in our 
sample—from 58 million in 1999 to 53 million in 2001—probably still reflects these workers 
being dropped from the ranks of the employed in company records.  
In contrast, there are two reasons to believe that firms may under-report the total number of 
workers.  First, firms often pay taxes and fees to the labor department of the local government 
that are proportional to their total employment which provides an incentive for under-reporting. 
This problem is more serious in coastal regions where migrant workers account for a larger share 
of employment. 
Second, it is common in China for firms may hire workers through a third party, called “labor 
dispatching” (laodong paiqian).  The dispatched workers are employed by the labor dispatching 
companies and sent to industrial firms.  While these workers are supposed to take only temporary 
jobs, many work for the firms for a long time.  Firms “rent” the dispatched workers to increase 
flexibility and hold down labor costs.  Because the dispatched workers are not official workers of 
the firms, the NBS survey does not include them.  It was estimated that there were 37 million 
dispatched workers in 2011.
19
  In some firms, the majority of the work force consists of the 
dispatched workers.  The government revised labor contract law in 2012 to restrict this practice. 
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 Source: “Revision of Labor Contract Law,” Xinhua News Agency, December 28, 2012. 
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One way this under-reporting shows up is through a lower than expected share of wages in 
value added.  This averages only 32% across the firms in the sample, while in China’s national 
accounts the wage share in GDP is almost 50%.
20
  While the industrial sectors are expected to 
have lower than average labor-intensity, the observed average seems implausibly low.  
Some aspects of worker compensation are also not reported throughout the entire period.  
Unemployment insurance and welfare expenditures are reported in every year, but pension 
contributions only since 2003, and housing subsidy since 2004.  Together they only make up a 
small fraction of total worker compensation, on average 3.5% in 2007.  The many reported zero 
values for these variables could indicate that total worker compensation, and thus the labor share 
in value added, is underreported. 
Moreover, there is a further decrease in the wage share in value added over time, which is the 
result of three evolutions.  First, average firm size is declining while the wage share is strongly 
increasing in firm size, as is the case in other countries.  Second, the share of wages in state 
owned firms, which initially was much higher than average, converged over time towards the 
lower average recorded by private firms.  And third, domestically owned private firms, which 
always had the lowest average wage share, increase in importance. 
(d) Value added 
Value added is not reported directly by firms.  It is calculated by NBS using the expenditure 
approach:  
value added = output  –  intermediate input  +  value added tax payable.21 
Holz (2008) shows that industrial value added is likely to be overestimated.  Zhu and Qian 
(2012) investigate why the Chinese labor share for manufacturing firms is that much lower than 
in other countries and also argue that value added of the above-scale firms may be overestimated. 
An upward bias in measured value added will lead to an overestimation of TFP and if the bias 
changes over time, TFP growth estimates can also be affected.   
In the first column of Table 7 we list industry GDP as reported in China Statistical Yearbook 
(2010), which is one component of GDP in the national accounts.  In the second column we list 
aggregate value added summed over all above-scale industrial firms in our sample, which is 
almost identical to the reported numbers in the Statistical Yearbook (except for 2004).  The two 
series converged markedly over the 1998-2007 period, but this implies that the latter series has 
grown much more rapidly.  In 2008, the NBS stopped reporting value added in the firm-level 
data files, as well as in the Statistical Yearbook and the Census Yearbook.  A possible reason for 
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 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) face the same discrepancy and they inflate wage payments by a constant factor for 
all firms to obtain a wage share in value added consistent with the national average. 
21
 The last term equals zero if the value added tax payable is negative.  In 2004, we use the same identity to 
construct output which was not reported directly in that year. 
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discontinuing this reporting is the growing inconsistency in the value-added estimates from the 
above-scale firm survey and China’s national accounts, which relies on data from a separate 
firm-level survey. 
Zhu and Qian (2012) investigate to what extent value added estimates differ if they are 
calculated using the (factor) income approach at the firm level.  Unfortunately, as discussed 
previously, data on labor compensation are likely incomplete, which now introduces a downward 
bias in the value added estimates.  Despite this shortcoming, we construct an alternative value 
added measure by adding four components: labor compensation, net indirect taxes (indirect taxes 
minus government subsidies), profit and depreciation.
22
 
The last columns in Table 7 list both the alternative value added aggregates and the 
components.  The new aggregate is lower than value added using the expenditure approach and 
the ratio of the expenditure to income value added tends to increase over time.  It could be that 
the upward bias in the expenditure approach became more serious or that the underreporting of 
labor income in the income approach became more serious, or a bit of both.  
[Table 7 approximately here] 
(e) Exports  
Prior to 2004, many private firms could only export through third parties, i.e. trade 
intermediaries.  At the start of the sample, only very few firms, in particular state owned firms, 
multinationals, and very large exporters, had direct trading privileges.  As a condition of China’s 
WTO accession, the system was liberalized and from 2004 onwards every firm had in principle 
the right to trade directly—both to import or export. 
When observations in the above-scale NBS firm-level data are linked to the Chinese 
information on trade transactions, the share of exports (and exporters) that can be matched is 
indeed increasing over time.
23
  Nevertheless, a sizeable fraction of exports are by firms that 
cannot be found in the firm-level data.  Imperfection in the matching process is one possible 
explanation, but there are likely to be many firms that continue to export indirectly even after 
2004 as they had already developed an effective relationship with a trade intermediary.  In 
addition, there are firms that report positive exports, but which cannot be found in the trade 
transaction data.  It is highly likely that some indirect exporters report positive export levels, 
even though they only sell directly to domestic trading firms. 
                                                 
22
 Labor compensation consists of wage, unemployment insurance, welfare expenditures, pension contributions 
(after 2003) and housing subsidy (after 2004).  Indirect taxes consist of three accounting items in our data: sales tax, 
value added tax and “other taxes under management expenses”. 
23
 We matched the two data sources by firm name, verifying several permutations of the generic characters in 
Chinese language firm names. 
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Statistics in the last two columns of Table 6 illustrate that 13.6% of firms are exporting 
continuously.  For firms that are active over the entire sample period—which tend to be larger 
and predominantly state owned firms—this fraction is almost 20%.  In addition, 9.6% of firms 
start exporting at some point.  For firms operating throughout the sample period this even stands 
at 27.6%.  By 2008, almost half of them are exporters.  Among firms active between six and ten 
years, 36% are exporters at some point during the sample period, a much higher fraction than for 
other large economies.  
4. Productivity gap between entrants and incumbents 
The importance of the different measurement and sampling problems we discussed will naturally 
depend on the application.  In this section we provide an illustrative example by documenting the 
evolution over time of the relative productivity gap between new entrants and incumbents.  
We calculate total factor productivity levels using the index number method also used in 
Brandt et al. (2012).  It is a Solow residual that uses the average of the firm-specific and the 
industry-average input shares in output as weight when subtracting input differences from the 
output difference.  We enforce constant returns to scale and calculate the capital share as the sum 
of labor and material shares.  Year by year, firm-level productivity is regressed on a set of 
provincial and ownership dummies as well as an entry dummy.  This dummy takes the value of 
one if it is the first year we observe a firm and the firm’s reported startup year is at most one year 
prior to the current year. 
If we deal with measurement issues the way we have described thus far, the benchmark 
estimates reveal that the relative performance of new entrants at the time of entry has declined 
noticeably over time.  This pattern is illustrated by the solid black line in Figure 2 and the dashed 
band shows the 95% confidence interval.  In 1999, the average entrant was slightly more 
productive than the average incumbent.  The difference even was significant in a statistical sense, 
but at 2% the economic difference was negligible.  By 2008, this difference had declined to a 
negative gap of approximately 9%, which is estimated very precisely.  One way of explaining 
this evolution is by a changing selection process driven by falling entry barriers.  Initially, only 
the most productive potential entrants were able to overcome entry restrictions.  Over time, this 
constraint relaxed and the average entrant in China now underperforms the average incumbent at 
the time of its entry, just as in other countries. 
[Figure 2 approximately here] 
The other two lines in Figure 2 illustrate that the results would come out differently without 
some of the adjustments we have advocated.  For example, the red dashed line shows the 
evolution of the productivity gap if the reported net value of fixed assets, directly from the 
company accounts, is used rather than the constructed real capital stock series.  This adjustment 
has a minor impact on the productivity of entrants, but it lowers the capital stock for incumbents 
and hence raises their measured total factor productivity.  This is especially true for incumbents 
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that have been observed for many years in the sample, i.e. in later years.  As a result, the pattern 
of a falling relative productivity level for new entrants becomes even more pronounced. 
The adjustment goes in the opposite direction if we do not condition on the reported startup 
year and count all firms as entrants in the first year that we observe them in the sample.  This 
erroneously classifies several older firms as entrants—the number of entrants almost doubles.  
On average, these older “entrants” have higher productivity levels than genuinely new firms.  As 
a result, the pattern of a falling productivity level for entrants largely disappears.  The green 
dashed line in Figure 2 moves somewhat erratically and the spike in 2004 is particularly 
worrying as we know that in that year many older firms entered the sample.   
Yet another adjustment we could make is to ignore the linkages using other information than 
NBS firm identifiers.  Firms whose ID changes following a restructuring would then be treated 
as exiting from the sample, while a new firm with a new ID enters the following year.  Counting 
restructured firms as entrants again biases the average productivity of that group upwards.  It 
would show up as a change in the same direction as the green line (not reported), but the 
difference with the black line is less pronounced. 
Entry rates vary substantially by region and it is sometimes suggested that this is related to 
differences in the quality of local economic institutions or different degrees of opening-up.  
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the quality of local institutions and firm entry rates 
at the provincial level for 2004.  The horizontal axis shows the marketization index constructed 
by Fan, Wang and Zhu (2010) which aggregates information on 19 indicators of institutional 
quality and 5 major areas of the market-oriented reforms.  The vertical axis shows the number of 
newly entered firms as a fraction of the total number of incumbents using the 2004 firm census 
which has no minimum sales threshold for inclusion.  There is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the two variables, consistent with the hypothesis that institutional reform 
leads to higher rates of firm entry.  
[Figure 3 approximately here] 
5. Topics for future research 
The NBS firm-level data has already been used extensively to study several aspects of firm 
dynamics in China, such as the process of entry, exit, and firm growth, both in terms of size and 
productivity.  Several more studies evaluate the productivity gap and other dimensions of 
performance differences between state owned and private firms or between exporters and firms 
only selling domestically.  Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), factor market restrictions that 
lead to input misallocation and depress aggregate output have also received some attention.  
Researchers broadly in the fields of industrial organization, international trade, and 
macroeconomics have studied several more topics.  
We believe, however, that the firm-level data is underexploited in several other fields. For 
example, in public economics the far-reaching reform of the tax system in 1995 has received a 
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lot of research attention at the aggregate level, but it has not been studied yet at the micro level.  
In the firm-level data, we observe a wide range of taxes: income tax (levied on profits) and 
government subsidies, value added tax, indirect taxes on output and inputs, as well as several 
items of worker compensation that in other countries are covered by payroll taxes, e.g. pension 
contributions.  An interesting feature is that the relative importance of the different taxes has 
changed over time.  Other interesting topics would be to estimate the difference in the burden of 
taxation across firm types or the impact of tax exemptions that many multinational subsidiaries 
have received. 
A second research area where this data could inform ongoing debates is the field of corporate 
finance.  Several researchers have used company accounts for firms listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock markets to study the performance of firms after they become listed or to study 
the relationship between financial performance and stock price evolution.  Industrial groups that 
are listed are also included in this data set, in some cases both prior and following their stock 
market listing, and their economic performance can also be compared to non-listed firms.  For 
state owned firms, the registration type variable indicates whether the firm has been reformed 
into a shareholding company or not, which is an interesting process in itself.  The relationship 
between changes in the ownership structure, as evidenced by the share of the six types of 
investors in the paid-up capital, and firm performance also provides interesting information on 
the importance of governance. 
Finally, some of the measurement issues we have discussed would benefit from additional 
scrutiny.  The measurement of value added has generated questions that the statisticians at NBS 
also do not have good answers for.  The extremely low value of labor income in value added is a 
related puzzle.  It might reflect the reality in Chinese manufacturing or it might reflect remaining 
measurement problems.  The development of detailed deflators covering the entire period, would 
be a third instance where most researchers using the firm-level data would benefit.  In many 
applications an easy solution is to simply include industry-year interaction fixed effects in a 
regression, but sometimes this is not possible.  Less than ideal double-deflation of output and 
inputs, which seem to be subject to different price evolutions, could also be a contributing factor 
to the declining wage share in income. 
We do not want to suggest that these measurement problems are insurmountable or that they 
preclude rigorous analysis of economic phenomena.  Making the firm-level annual surveys or 
censuses available and useful for economic research has taken many countries several decades.  
This is an ongoing process where many of the solutions can be and should be continuously 
improved.  We believe that the best way to make progress is to tackle interesting economic 
questions and resolve the data problems that are most important for the question at hand.  In this 
way, we can decentralize problem solving activities and benefit from each other’s work.  We 
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Year Number            
of firms Sales Output
Value      
added Employment
Net value of              
fixed assets         
(original value)
Export
1998 165,118 6.41 6.77 1.94 56.44 4.41 1.08
1999 162,033 6.99 7.27 2.16 58.05 4.73 1.16
2000 162,883 8.42 8.57 2.54 53.68 5.18 1.46
2001 169,030 9.24 9.41 2.79 52.97 5.45 1.61
2002 181,557 10.95 11.08 3.30 55.21 5.95 2.01
2003 196,222 14.32 14.23 4.20 57.49 6.61 2.69
2004 279,092 20.43   20.16* 6.62 66.27 7.97 (12.54) 4.05
2005 271,835 24.69 25.16 7.22 68.96 8.95 4.77
2006 301,961 31.36 31.66 9.11 73.58 10.58 6.05
2007 336,768 39.97 40.52 11.70 78.75 12.34 7.34
2008 327,853 39.04 38.77  11.82* 69.08 12.02 6.35
(b) China Statistical Yearbook (2009, Table 13-4): above-scale industrial firms
Year Number            
of firms Sales Output
Value      
added Employment
Net value of    
fixed assets Export
1998 165,080 6.41 6.77 1.94 61.96 4.41 1.08
1999 162,033 6.99 7.27 2.16 58.05 4.73 1.15
2000 162,885 8.42 8.57 2.54 55.59 5.18 1.46
2001 171,256 9.37 9.54 2.83 54.41 5.54 1.62
2002 181,557 10.95 11.08 3.30 55.21 5.95 2.01
2003 196,222 14.32 14.23 4.20 57.49 6.61 2.69
2004 276,474 18.78 20.17 5.48 66.22 7.38 4.05
2005 271,835 24.46 25.16 7.21 67.85 8.81 4.79
2006 301,961 31.36 31.66 9.11 73.58 10.58 5.96
2007 336,768 39.97 40.52 11.70 78.75 12.34 7.34
2008 426,113 50.74 88.38 15.17 8.25
(c) Census Yearbooks
Year Number            
of firms Sales Output Employment
Original value of 
fixed assets Export
Above Scale
1995 162,114 4.85 66.82 4.17
2004 279,040 20.42 20.17 66.22 12.58 4.05
2008 426,113 50.74 88.38 24.53 8.25
Below Scale
1995 331,090 0.35 16.88 0.26
2004 1,098,789 1.98 2.06 26.82 1.24 0.11
2008 1,477,267 3.66 31.69 2.20
Fraction above scale
1995 32.9% 93.3% 79.8% 94.1%
2004 20.3% 91.2% 90.7% 71.2% 91.0% 97.5%
2008 22.4% 93.3% 73.6% 91.8%
Table 1: Comparison of firm-level sample with China Statistical Yearbook and Census
Notes: Above scale means SOEs and all other firms with sales above 5 million RMB. The export information 
in panel (b) is taken from China Statistical Abstract (2009, Table 10-2). All values denoted in trillions RMB 
and employment in millions of workers. Industrial sector covers mining, manufacturing, and utilities. 
Variables indicated by * are imputed.
(a) Firm-level data set
Table 2: Variables reported in the annual NBS above-scale firm-level survey
(almost) Always reported (1998-2008)
Identifying 
information:
ID, name, registration type, shareholding status, legal person name, industry code, 
geographic code, zip code, street, phone, start year, start month, "lishu" supervising 
body, industrial activity unitsa
Stocks: Capital structure: owners' equity, paid-up capital -- split into six exhaustive categories: 
state, collective, foreign, HMT, individual, legal person
Assets: total, current, average current, fixed assets (separately: total, net value, at 
original price), intangiblec, inventory, accounts receivable
Debt: total, current, long-term
Flows: Output: sales revenue, output valueb, of which industrial outputb or new productsb, value 
addedc, exports, total profit, operation profit, production, top 3 products 
Input factors: employment, wages, materials and intermediate inputs,  long-term 
investment, depreciation (current year & cumulative), property insurance, financial cost, 
interest expense, management cost
Taxes:  income tax payable, value added tax payable, sales tax, input tax, subsidybc
More detailed breakdowns added since 2003 or 2004:
Noteworthy variables:
1998-2003: Output at constant prices (in addition to usual current prices)
2001-2007: R&D (not 2004)
Only 2004:
- Breakdown of employment (total and female) by:
5 education levels: postgraduate, university, college, high school, primary or less
3 technical titles (not exhaustive): senior, intermediate, junior
4 categories (not exhaustive): technician, senior tech.,  adv. engineer, mid-level worker
- Number of computers, number of microcomputers
- Special costs (unionization, trips, pollution), net cash flow of operational, financial,
and investment activities
- Parent firm, parent firm ID, registration ID
-  Sales, costs, and financial performance now reported separately for operational activities and for 
main line of business
-  Salary expenditures: pension, housing subsidy, welfare, labor and unemployment insurance 
-  Additional cost categories: advertising, transportation, administration, staff training,..
-  Other: cash inflows and outflows, end-of-year employment, accounts payable, female workers
Notes: A number of variables that are reported only occasionally are omitted. a not in 2001, b not in 2004, c not in 2008
Observations Firms Observations Firmsa
1 7.2% 27.9%
2-3 17.6% 27.6% 2.7% 3.8%
4-5 25.1% 21.3% 2.5% 8.0%
6-10 36.1% 18.3% 3.9% 21.1%
11 14.0% 4.9% 3.8% 29.8%
Total 2,539,519 660,510 3.3% 11.2%
Years in the 
sample
Fraction of … Fraction of links established not by ID
Notes: a Fraction of firms with a year-on-year link established not by ID at least once over the observed period.
Table 3:  Linking observations over time to identify firms
NBS ID other 
informatio





1998 163,295 23,276 14.3%
1999 159,694 21,860 131,198 6,636 23,042 13.7% 82.2% 4.2% 14.4%
2000 160,956 24,183 132,949 3,824 32,256 15.0% 82.6% 2.4% 20.0%
2001 167,259 40,115 119,662 7,482 19,676 24.0% 71.5% 4.5% 11.8%
2002 179,811 30,733 144,238 4,840 21,621 17.1% 80.2% 2.7% 12.0%
2003 195,737 38,362 149,975 7,400 33,441 19.6% 76.6% 3.8% 17.1%
2004 278,183 115,667 146,848 15,668 39,518 41.6% 52.8% 5.6% 14.2%
2005 270,997 33,756 232,275 4,966 21,152 12.5% 85.7% 1.8% 7.8%
2006 301,165 48,849 248,245 4,071 23,663 16.2% 82.4% 1.4% 7.9%
2007 335,812 58,375 274,000 3,437 96,255 17.4% 81.6% 1.0% 28.7%
2008 326,610 85,315 236,919 4,376 26.1% 72.5% 1.3%
Table 4: Evolution of the panel over time
Notes: a Firms that exit and later re-enter the sample (less than 1% of firms) are considered to be operating throughout. 
Entrant here means entering into the sample. To identify entrants into the industry, one should also incorporate the 
information about a firm's startup year. 

















1998 36.8 27.6 1.71 1.26
2008 52.9 (+44%) 39.6 (+43%) 0.52 (+229%) 0.38 (+232%)
SOE (1998) 41.4 30.4 3.26 2.33
other (1998) 33.5 (-19%) 25.6 (-16%) 1.19 (+174%) 0.90 (+159%)
small (1998) 37.1 29.1 5.15 73.65
large (1998) 36.6 (-1%) 26.8 (-8%) 4.57 (+13%) 69.87 (+5%)
entrant (2008) 39.0 34.3 0.48 0.41
incumbent (2008) 58.3 (+49%) 41.3 (+21%) 0.53 (-10%) 0.38 (+8%)
Notes: Capital per worker is denoted in thousands of RMB (in 1998 prices).  "Net fixed assets" is fixed assets at original 
purchase prices less depreciation, as reported in the data set, which we deflated using the investment deflator. Percentage 
changes on the capital-value added ratio are reported for the inverse (capital productivity). 
capital-labor ratio capital-value added ratio
Table 6:  Fraction of firms that change status
4-digit 2-digit 23 types 5 types Always Starting
1 184,098 13.2%
2-3 182,624 13.9% 7.6% 19.0% 11.8% 12.1% 5.3%
4-5 140,659 21.9% 12.1% 32.0% 21.2% 13.9% 13.1%
6-10 120,851 40.8% 22.8% 54.4% 39.0% 14.5% 21.9%
11 32,278 41.4% 22.6% 67.2% 49.9% 19.5% 27.6%
Total 660,510 18.0% 10.0% 25.3% 17.3% 13.6% 9.6%
Notes: "Industry" according to adjusted Chinese Industry Classification system that was made time-consistent; "type" 
according to 23 original entries in the NBS classification of registered enterprise type or 5 aggregate types (SOE, hybrid, 
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1998 3402 1941 1446 591 392 146 317
1999 3586 2156 1624 603 429 230 363
2000 4003 2539 1984 648 496 439 400
2001 4358 2790 2118 668 535 469 445
2002 4743 3299 2424 749 603 579 494
2003 5495 4199 3090 921 750 834 586
2004 6521  6620a 4156 1299 915 1194 748
2005 7723 7218 5074 1533 1112 1479 950
2006 9131 9110 6384 1896 1407 1950 1131
2007 11053 11700 8254 2352 1824 2715 1363
Notes: a This was the only value where our firm-level aggregate differed noticeably from the reported value for 
above-scale firms in China's Statistical Yearbook (compare panels (a) and (b) in Table 1). All values reported in 
million RMB. Labor compensation includes wage, unemployment insurance, welfare expenditures, pension 
contributions (after 2003) and housing subsidy (after 2004). Net indirect taxes equal indirect taxes minus 
government subsidy. The indirect taxes covers three Chinese accounting items in our data: sales tax, value added 
tax and other taxes under management expenses.  
Total value added 
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Figure 1: Output, input, and investment deflators
Notes:   The output deflator is calculated from firm-level reports of nominal and real sales in the 
annual NBS above-scale industrial firm surveys (1998-2003).  The series is extrapolated to 2008 
using the 2-digit ex-factory price index from the China Statistical Yearbook.  The input deflator is 
calculated by multiplying the output deflator (an industry-vector) with the 2002 National Input-
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Figure 2: Productivity difference between entrants and incumbents
Notes: Results are obtained from separate OLS regressions by year on the full sample of firms from the 
annual NBS above-scale industrial firm surveys (1998-2008).  The dependent variable is total factor 
productivity and the statistics shown are regression coefficients and confidence intervals for  the only 
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Figure 3:  Higher rates of firm entry in provinces that underwent broader institional reform
Notes: The Marketization Index measures the quality of local institutions and the extent of market-oriented 
reforms at the provincial level, taken from Fan, Wang and Zhu (2010).  Firm entry rates are calculated from the 
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